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EMERSON, VIRTUE AND EVIL: THOUGHTS FOR A RESCUE 
OPERATION 
Dr. Lois Eveleth 
 
Every scripture is to be interpreted by the same spirit 
which gave it forth. Emerson, “Nature” 
 
Mystical classics have neither birthday nor native land. 
William James, Varieties of Religious Experience 
 
 
 The great theme of self-reliance pervading the essays of Ralph Waldo Emerson 
resonates well with an American spirit of independence and individualism.  Critic Brooks 
Atkinson was representative of this mainstream view of Emerson when he wrote that 
Emerson “…was the first philosopher of the American Spirit.”1 More recently, though, 
others such as Robert Bellah have discovered that, while Americans may have perfected a 
rhetoric of independence, they have need also of developing a rhetoric of community.  
We can see the difference between these two rhetorical forms if we place self-reliance 
within a context of ethical theories.  Placed there, self-reliance seems to approach ethical 
egoism.  If this is so, self-reliance may suffer the weakness of egoism, viz. impotence in 
conflict resolution and in developing a sense of community.  There are even more 
substantial criticisms of Emerson.  The gentle damning of him by Yves Simon comes to 
mind, when this Aristotelian classified the Sage of Concord with writers who “…instead 
of theories of virtue have developed theories of natural spontaneity.”  (emphasis his).  Or 
Newton Arvin, in a literary idiom: Emerson is unwilling to give “…a steady 
confrontation of Tragedy, or a sustained and unswerving gaze at the face of Evil.”2 Any 
such charges that Emerson understood neither evil nor virtue deserve attention, for they 
are serious criticisms against one who consistently wrote in moralistic terms. 
 It is fairer to Emerson to read him on his own terms and give him the most 
sympathetic reading possible.  His lengthy passages on moral questions are part of the 
tradition of Idealism, and his presuppositions and very questions have ancient roots in the 
Neo-Platonism of Plotinus.  Emerson read the Enneads and acknowledged their 
attractiveness.  His Harvard education, which introduced him to the Neo-Platonism of the 
Cambridge Platonists, has also been cited as an influence.3 In the interest of fairness, we 
should read Emerson with this connection in mind.  What follow is a selection of textual 
evidence and interpretation intended to provide a context that allows a sympathetic 
reading of the essays.  By thus shifting the context one sees, I believe, that Emerson’s 
ethical stance is certainly more complex, and maybe more enlightened, than some would 
suppose. 
 An idealist, Emerson claimed priority of Spirit, or OverSoul, over the physical.  
The OverSoul continually manifests itself as Nature within its cosmic ecstasy, i.e., an 
eternal process remarkably like Neo-Platonic emanation.  He even uses this special term. 
 
Every natural fact is an emanation and 
                                                        that from which it emanates is an 
emanation also, and from every eman- 
                                                        ation is a new emanation. If anything 
                                                        could stand still, it would be crushed 
                                                        and dissipated by the torrent it 
                                                        resisted…The beauty of these fair 
                                                        objects is imported into them from a 
                                                        metaphysical and eternal spring.4 
 
This is substantial activity underlying whatever discrete forms emerge.  A benefit of so 
doing is that, if one stresses the priority of process over structure, one is able to give, as 
Emerson does, an explanation to diversity.  While flux is fundamental, there is still order.  
Unity is postulated; it does not require an explanation, since all is OverSoul.  In 
Plotinus’s words: “The universe, moved eternally by an intelligent Soul, becomes blessed 
and alive…never has this cosmos been without a soul…it has a soul that does not belong 
to it yet is present to it.”5 Negatively expressed, this unity is not a homogeneity, the 
components being indistinguishable from each other, but an ordering within which 
diversity is achieved.  Because of this order, the flux cannot run to chaos. 
 Relation or relatedness is the one and only ordering principle in his system: to be 
is to be in relation.  This claim effectively establishes Nature as an organic-type system 
whose constituent elements and processes are mutually defining and interdependent.  As 
far as man is concerned, his characteristics are those of Nature.  If Nature is OverSoul-
made-manifest, man also is dualistic.  He is one with the OverSoul; he is “part and parcel 
of the whole:” His spirit is “…the same divinity transmuted” and he knows the “intimate 
divinity.”  (W.I.221; W.I.268)  Compare this to Plotinus.  “The Ideas are not spatially 
estranged from us.  Wherever there is a soul that has risen from its body, the Ideas are 
there.  The realm of sense is localized; the intelligible realm is not.”6 The divinity is 
“…present to all beings though they may not know it.”  Man, for Emerson, is “…a stream 
whose source is hidden.”  Spirit, consciousness, or moral sentiment: these are just three 
of the words scattered through the essays, which refer to persons.  These terms have an 
identical referent.  They are various ways of referring to the “primitive force” in man, an 
energy, a dynamism which “lurks within all,” a force impelling one both to know Nature 
and to act within it. 
 Man is distinctive, though, within Nature, in that his is a multi-leveled 
consciousness, which defines his function within, and responsibility to Nature.  Such 
‘levels’ are a metaphorical rendering of the creative human process of growth in insight.  
The metaphor, whose roots extend back to Plato’s Divided Line, is less a claim that there 
are levels than that a process is eternally the case.  Plotinus uses vision imagery.  “The 
Fatherland for us is there whence we have come…what is the course?...We must close 
our eyes and invoke a new manner of seeing.”7 Such a new manner of seeing is based on 
Plotinus’s extraordinary answer to what will later be called the mind-body problem.  He 
writes: “The soul is not body and it contains rather than is contained.  It is no more in the 
body than it is in a vase.”8 
 Emerson describes three levels or stages of such vision, i.e. intuition, reason, and 
imagination.  Intuition is an inchoate, pre-conceptual, pre-reflexive capacity, according to 
which man is at home in Nature.  At the second level a knowing subject distinguishes 
himself from what is not himself, defining that phenomenon, now uniquely limited or 
defined by his intentionality, as ‘object’.  The process is a separating and is the human 
definition of ‘fact’.  It creates diversity.  The third phase, the most valuable, is the work 
of imagination.  Imagination re-aligns all relations, a re-alignment made necessary by the 
introduction of each new object.  It is the capacity to synthesize and then to give 
expression both to the new object and to the realigned web of relationships rendered 
necessary by the incorporation of new fact.  Only human consciousness is accomplishing 
this work, and therein we see the special role of man.  The unique function of mankind is 
to know Nature and to give expression to this knowledge.  Man’s work is “this 
conversion of all nature into the rhetoric of thought.”  (W.II.337)  Nature is not an 
assemblage of structures: 
 
There are no fixtures in nature.  The universe 
   is fluid and volatile.  Permanence is but a word 
                                                  of degrees.  Our globe seen by God is a 
transparent law, not a mass of facts.  The law 
   dissolves the fact and holds it fluid.  (W.II.302) 
 
Accordingly, human knowledge is not information about structures but understanding of 
relations.  These relationships are such that they are not independent of the human 
knower.  Instead, the relationships ascertained within Nature are a function of human 
consciousness, which is, by definition, itself a relational capacity.  Emerson makes on 
this point a startling claim: the emanation of forms and the growth of consciousness are 
correlative, maybe identifiable.  There is a sense in which man ‘creates’ Nature, if only in 
the sense that Nature has no meaning without man’s conscious attention.  Because man is 
a web of relations, Nature is a web of relations.  Man is within Nature as Nature’s self-
knowledge; man is “nature’s finer success in self-explication.”  (W.II.352)  “Where he is, 
there is Nature.”  (W.II.60)  Man is Nature-knowing-itself. 
This knowledge is a continuing process, circles being Emerson’s image for the process. 
 
The life of man is a self-evolving circle, 
which, from a ring imperceptibly small, 
rushes on all sides outwards to new and 
  larger circles, and that without end.  The 
   extent to which this generation of circles, 
   wheel without wheel, will go depends on 
the force or truth of the individual soul. 
(W.II.303-4) 
 
 Truth is defined appropriately as the growth of consciousness.  The seeker of truth 
cannot repose and still have a claim on truth.  (W.II.341)  The criterion for the 
recognition of truth is its invitation to further inquiry.  Why this criterion must be such is 
seen in the requirement of synthesis: each new insight must be incorporated, and the act 
of incorporation generates further inquiry.  The process is virtually infinite.  In no way, 
then, can stagnation or satisfaction gain respectability.  “…the moment we cease to report 
and attempt to correct and contrive, it is not truth.”  (W.II.329) 
 The process or growth that ontologically is movement toward ever-greater unity, 
is, epistemologically, movement toward ever-greater insight.  In the language of Plotinus 
this process is the ‘return’.  Human action, though, is also part of the process: action 
completes knowledge.  “That man shall be learned who reduceth his learning to 
practice…the only way into nature is to enact our best insight.”  (W.II.22)  “The power to 
see is not separated from the will to do.”  (W.II.281) 
 Human consciousness is always a moral sentiment.  Emerson’s most suggestive 
description of the moral sentiment is that it is “the law of laws.”  (W.II.123)  
Functionally, this dynamism is the unanalyzable source of the relational capacity of man 
in Nature; morally, it is the ordering or grading (law) of all human relations (laws).  
There can be no doubt that the possibilities open to one’s actions are virtually infinite, at 
least in the sense that limits are too changeable to be tabulated.  From this array one 
chooses, and, for one’s choices, Emerson offered a means of grading or evaluation.  This 
law of laws is without content: there is no specific content, no specific action either 
praised or condemned.  If there were content, this guiding principle could not be 
universal.  It is required, though, to be universal, sufficiently unspecified to apply in 
every instance.  Still, its applicability to human action and its evaluative function demand 
that this universal principle be also regulative. 
 The unity of things is the law of laws.  What everyone is willing to have 
universalized is unity.  Just as greater clarity of knowledge follows upon an increasing 
relatedness, so too the goodness of unity or harmony attends relatedness.  Consider the 
Enneads, where the highest hypostasis, The One, is itself Unity.  “Here is unity superior 
to any your thought lays hold of, unity that exists by itself and in itself and is without 
attributes.”9 It is known in no ordinary way: “…awareness of The One comes to us 
neither by knowing nor by the pure thought that discovers the other intelligible things, 
but by a presence transcending knowledge.”  (emphasis mine)10 This process or discovery 
or return is also a purification, or, virtue.  “Union with its kin is its good; with the foreign, 
it is evil…Virtue is what results in the soul from conversion.”11 
 Emerson, placing the universal principle within man, disallowed anything 
external from that position of universality; nothing external to man – no great social 
plans, political vision, or economic programs – can be a goal for which man would have 
to be construed as means.  Morality is a human affair which, even while advocating an 
individualism, an attitude associated with disunity, neither deteriorates to a disunity nor 
suggests a social fragmentation. 
 Assessments of actions and decision-making among available choices are to be 
achieved in terms of the universal principle.  Moral judging is comparative in character: 
action A is good to the extent that it approximates harmony; action A is preferable to 
action B to the extent that it achieves a closer approximation to the ideal.  In both cases, 
i.e., comparing A with the ideal, and comparing A, B, and the ideal, the innate moral 
sentiment, that “reserved force, which acts directly by presence and without means”  
(W.II.89-90), seeking harmony, “makes by its presence or absence right and wrong, 
beauty and ugliness, genius or depravation.”  (W.II.289) 
 Because the moral sentiment is a drive to seek harmony, whatever is termed ‘evil’ 
is less harmonious than an alternative.  Evil is an absence of goodness, goodness which 
we wish were there, or goodness which we hope someday to put there.  Evil is analogous 
to ugliness, as goodness is to beauty.  Ugliness is an absence of beauty, beauty which we 
wish were there, or beauty which we will someday allow to emerge or will create for 
ourselves.  Humans are the only beings in Nature who see goodness, who see beauty, 
who are besotted with these, who are disappointed when these are absent, and who bend 
every effort to create them.  If action A approximates the ideal more than action B does, 
B is, to that extent, evil.  “The only sin is limitation.”  (W.II.308)  “Nothing is so weak as 
an egotist.:  (W.I.391) 
Evil is a form of separation. The disease 
begins in the will, a disease of rebellion 
and separation, but the intellect is soon 
      infected, so that the man ceases to see God 
                                                       whole in each object….  (W.II.105) 
 Far from preaching an overweening individualism, Emerson is advocating an ideal of 
unity, which can be labeled individualistic only in origin and responsibility.  Choosing 
the less harmonious is choosing evil.  Nothing can be labeled, in itself, either good or 
evil: action B is evil only in comparison to action A; A is not good in itself, nor can it 
ever be.  If anything were construed as good in itself, it would be raised to the status of a 
goal, thus reducing man and human action to the status of means for its achievement.  
The appropriate human sentiment or instinct is to refuse the dominion of facts (W.II.33).  
Such a person, seeing the principle, sees that “the facts fall aptly and supple into their 
places; they know their master, and the meanest of them glorifies him.”  (W.II.33)  The 
“fountain of all good”, and so, of evil, is within man, and nowhere outside him.”  
(W.I.125)  The disharmony of limitation or separation can describe all forms of evil.  
“Whilst thus the world will be whole and refuses to be disparted, we seek to act partially, 
to sunder, to appropriate…” (W.II.103).  “The weakness of the will begins when the 
individual would be something of himself.”  (W.II.271) 
 Plotinus writes that “ugliness and evil are basically one.”12  “Evil is of this lower 
realm, brought into being by need, privation, defect…”13  “…when the soul begins to 
hate its shame and puts away evil and makes its return, it finds it peace.”14 
 For Emerson, who sees harmony as a function of relatedness, the choice of the 
partial or separate can only mean the choice of that which is less related to other 
phenomena within Nature; in turn, the choice of the relatively unrelated is, to that degree, 
a failure to achieve an ever-possible harmony.  Such a choice may be termed ‘evil.’ 
 Just as this cosmic process of all things to unity is a latter-day rendering of the 
Neo-Platonic return of the Enneads, Emerson’s concept of evil is best read as a rendering 
of the Plotinian notion of evil.  One passage reads: 
 
We are not separated from The One, not 
distant from it…It is because of The One 
that we breathe and have our being…As 
                                                      we turn towards The One, we exist to a 
higher degree, while to withdraw from it 
is to fall. Our soul is delivered from evil 
by rising to that place which is free of all 
                                                      evils…there it truly lives.15 
  And elsewhere: 
    It is not the soul’s nature to attain to utter 
nothingness. Falling into evil it falls, in 
this sense, into nothingness, but still not 
                                                       complete nothingness. And when it 
  reverses direction, it arrives not at some- 
                                                       thing different but at itself.16 
 
 Evil is the relative nothingness of all things.  For Plotinus, even the highest 
hypostases just below The One are evil in part, since they lack the fullness of The One.  
Each being looks Janus-like in two directions, viz. at those things below it, less than itself 
and relatively evil, but upward also, at what it may still become.  This twofold insight is 
itself an impetus to the return.  Logically the status of the return in this schema is one of a 
completion or fulfillment of emanation.  Systematically, an emanation/return duality is 
appropriate, because everything about Nature is dualistic.  Emanation functions as an 
explanation of diversity, of the continuing possibility of the emergence of new form; the 
requirement of a completion to this diversification is a requirement of unity for whatever 
possibilities may or can emerge as real in Nature. 
 How, though, can one measure success, if this goal or ideal be elusive?  
Emerson’s answer was aesthetic in formulation: there is a correlation between Nature and 
man, such that moral success is measured by beauty.  This echoes Plotinus: 
 
Goodness and Beauty are also one… 
   How can one see the beauty of a good 
     soul? Withdraw into yourself and look. 
  If you do not as yet see beauty within 
    you, do as does the sculptor of a statue 
that is to be beautified: he cuts away 
                                                         here, he smoothes it there…17 
 
Beauty is less in Nature than it is a sign of man’s harmony, according to Emerson.  The 
problem of restoring to the world original and eternal beauty is solved by the redemption 
of the soul…The reason why the world lacks unity, and lies broken and in heaps, is 
because man is disunited in himself.”  (W.I.73)  Everything answers to the moral power 
in man, this moral power being a function of the harmonization, which he has achieved.  
To the extent that a person has approached this ideal, to that extent he enjoys moral 
power or (the more usual term) virtue.  One measures his success by looking to, by 
considering Nature.  Beauty in Nature is the mark of virtue in man. 
 The hero is a paradigm of the self-trust advisable for everyone, of pride and 
optimism in one’s energy and self-initiating power.  This dynamism of every person, 
ontologically identified with the OverSoul, is a drive to enter into relations, because thus 
the energy manifests itself.  Yet, every person enters into a repertoire of such constitutive 
relations, which is, forever, unique to him, the possibilities of such unique ‘sets’ of 
relations being virtually infinite.  To do the opposite, i.e. to deny self-trust, is to trust in 
others, in society, the past, or in institutions.  This, for Emerson, is vice, because it denies 
the source of one’s creativity; denying creativity, it effectively denies the source of one’s 
personal harmony; denying this, it prevents individualization.  Individualization thus 
becomes an achievement of moral success; one’s identity, a function of one’s relations, is 
a duty which each person should take up. 
 Basic self-reliance achieves a unique set of relations, an achievement of 
individualization.  ‘Character’, then, has both an ontological and moral connotation: what 
individuates a man is his character: one achieves ethical and ontological character 
conjointly.  “Character is higher that intellect…Living is the functionary…” (W.I.99).  It 
is in the realm of human action that one sees, with Emerson, a coherence of ontological 
and moral considerations.  Personal excellence or virtue of character is the great task of 
self-creation. 
 Not everyone takes his task seriously, and some do not recognize their 
responsibility at all.  Some seem content to guide their lives by the opinions of others or 
by events and things.  Some choose the merely partial.  Such person possesses less 
character or virtue than their opposites.  Human cooperation is an ideal but not a 
necessary condition of ultimate harmony.  If Emerson had made human cooperation a 
necessary condition, harmony could not be universal and inevitable.  In his organic 
model, the integrity of the whole system takes precedence over individual integrity.  
“Justice,” he says, “is not postponed.”  (W.II.102)  There will be harmony in Nature, one 
that includes human actions and choice integrally.  Yet, if not with the full cooperation of 
human choice, then, inevitably, with some involvement of humanity and retribution and 
compensation.  The coherence of this inexorable system makes retribution and 
accommodation necessary.  Just as, ontologically, flux cannot run to chaos, in ethical 
terms, human choice cannot frustrate the OverSoul. 
 Ontologically, unity is possible only if, and to the degree that, diversity is the 
case.  Man by his creativity and his choice introduces greater diversity into Nature, 
thereby raising the bar for unity.  Just as diversity is a necessary condition of unity, evil is 
a necessary condition of good.  For the appreciation and understanding of unity, diversity 
must be the case.  Similarly, for the appreciation and understanding of good, evil must be 
the case.  Evil, which is an absence of good, has a private status.  Man is the only being 
who perceives evil, or, the absence of good, thereby raising the bar for the good.  Central 
is the human intuition of unity and good.  Had Emerson remained fully wed to Puritan 
theology, he would probably have explained such intuition with the doctrine of God’s 
irresistible grace to the elect.  This theological terminology is absent in the essays, yet 
such intuition mirrors the lack of freedom of the elect whom, given grace, must do good 
works.  Their good works cannot bring about their salvation, for the elect are not free but 
rather are acting under the compulsion of grace.  The good works, which they do, are, not 
the cause of their salvation, but a symptom of their call.  Rejecting Christianity or 
Puritanism, Emerson no longer divided up humanity into two groups, the elect and the 
reprobate.  Still, there are similarities between the rejected Puritanism and the worldview 
of the essays, similarities hard to forget when reading the essays.  While the elect and 
reprobate may not be here, their ‘ghosts’ are present as two poles within which human 
transcendence proceeds. 
 Some conclusions are in order.  There is textual evidence that Emerson applied 
and adapted the emanation-return scheme but did so creatively.  Certainly there are 
differences.  The hierarchy of hypostases or forms is gone, and we have instead Nature as 
an organic, dynamic manifestation of Spirit continually embodying itself.  Virtue in 
Plotinus is ontological and intellectual; in Emerson, virtue is also moral and aesthetic.  
Comparing the two men, however, is not the goal.  It is a crucial means of establishing 
that Emerson’s ideas of virtue and evil are a creative adaptation of an earlier, complex 
world-view.  As such the essays should be read.  Transcendentalism cannot be read apart 
from its third-century ancestor.  His mysticism is usually not mentioned, and we should 
look for its effects on the language, form and content of the essays.  One translator-
editor’s description of the method of Plotinus may be applied to Emerson: The ontology 
of Plotinus reposes upon the psychology of introspection.18 His worldview is indeed 
complex.  It is an American Idealism.  In addition to its ancient connection, it carries 
some echoes from Berkeley and Kant.  If one is forgetful of Emerson’s philosophical 
commitment, he runs a risk of missing what the essays are doing.  Keeping Plotinus 
specifically in mind is a virtual necessity.  Within Nature and/or OverSoul, man enjoys a 
distinctive place.  His distinction is established by his morally creative consciousness.  
The great theme of self-reliance is not an unenlightened, optimistic exercise in 
spontaneity but an ethical principle based on an ontology and corrected by the mandate of 
unity or harmony.  One’s virtue is the creation of his character, a word also used in both 
ontological and ethical senses.  This dual use is suitable here, since these two realms are 
coextensive in Nature as a whole.  Nothing in Nature is without some degree of identity 
and as a whole. 
 Emerson’s challenge to achieve unity is key to preventing an exaggerated 
individualism.  It is the feature of the Essays that we should revisit.  Here we have indeed 
a complex work-view, for it requires us to think of metaphysics, epistemology and ethics 
conjointly, rather than disjunctively or of each separately.  It asks us to share an 
intuitively based vision and to do without tightly argued premises and conclusions.  But, I 
believe it is an enlightened view.  It is an urging to unity, to a moral vision that 
Americans in particular need.  What difference does it make?  It says that unity is the 
primary goal – not power, money, technological progress, and not even information.  It 
says that humans are the agents.  If we do not accomplish this, it will not get done.  We 
are acting on our own.  We ought to do it.  We are free to do it.  And we are free not to do 
it.  Progress is not inevitable.  Regression is possible. 
 And we should learn, someday, how to tell the difference. 
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